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“Secrets, silent, stony sit in the dark palaces of both our hearts: 
secrets weary of their tyranny: tyrants willing to be 
dethroned.” 
--James Joyce 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Human beings are curious by nature.  We love to ask 
the “why” questions and would rather be privy to a secret 
than be kept in the dark.  Not surprisingly, government 
conspiracy theories are quite popular.1  It is much more 
                                                 
*Associate Professor of Law, Lincoln Memorial University-Duncan 
School of Law. I would like to thank Lauren Mullins for her 
invaluable research assistance, enthusiasm, thoughts and critiques 
on this topic. 
1 JFK (Warner Bros. 1991) (US Gross Box Office = $70,405,498) 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0102138/business?ref_=tt_dt_bus; 
CONSPIRACY THEORY (Warner Bros. 1997) (US Gross Box Office = 
37                                                  3 LMU LAW REVIEW (2015) 
 
 
interesting to think part of the government was somehow 
involved in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy 
rather than believe the lone gunman theory, or that the 
government is covering up an alien invasion by storing UFOs 
and alien bodies at Area 51 in Roswell rather than believe no 
such thing exists.2 
Thus, when Edward Snowden revealed that one of the 
government’s most secretive agencies, the National Security 
Agency (“NSA”), previously nicknamed “No Such Agency,” 
was keeping a huge secret from the American people and 
monitoring American citizens’ phone calls, instant messaging, 
emails, documents kept in the “cloud,” contact lists, 
metadata,3 GPS data, etc., this became one of the greatest 
government conspiracy theories to contemplate since JFK and 
Roswell.   
Is the NSA listening to my phone call right now?  What 
if I say the word “president” or “al Qaeda,” would they 
definitely be listening then?  Or what if I “Google” one of 
these words?  Would the NSA instantly watch what websites I 
am viewing? 
Of course, it would be extremely difficult to keep such 
a large-scale government conspiracy under wraps.  It seems 
                                                                                                       
$76,081,498) 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0118883/business?ref_=tt_dt_bus.  
2 Journalist Annie Jacobsen surmised that the UFOs and aliens found 
in Roswell, Nevada in 1947 were actually Russian children around 
12-years-old with large heads and abnormally shaped, over-sized 
eyes that were the genetic experiments of Josef Mengele, a former 
German Nazi officer and physician in Auschwitz.  ANNIE JACOBSEN, 
AREA 51: AN UNCENSORED HISTORY OF AMERICA’S TOP SECRET 
MILITARY BASE 2011.  Soviet leader Joseph Stalin wanted to cause 
hysteria in America with the thought of “UFOs and an alien 
invasion.”  Id.   
3 Metadata, or transactional information, is collected as phone calls 
“are handed over, as is location data, call duration, unique 
identifiers, and the time and duration of all calls. The contents of the 
conversation itself are not covered.”  Glenn Greenwald, NSA 
collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers daily, THE 
GUARDIAN, June 5, 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-
records-verizon-court-order.  The "business records" provision of the 
PATRIOT Act (50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2014)) has been used as a legal 
justification for bulk collection of domestic telephone records.  Id. 
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surprising that any top-secret classified government operation 
is kept a secret.  Ben Franklin’s famous quote, “[t]hree may 
keep a secret, if two of them are dead,”4 might sound 
melodramatic but it rings true.  Not much is kept secret 
anymore – in fact, there appears to be more and more 
disclosures as spies, whistleblowers, journalists, and insiders 
begin to share their knowledge and spread it throughout the 
internet.  The public clamors it has a need-to-know in order to 
keep the government in check. 
But what is it we need to know?  Do we need to know 
the specifics as to how individual NSA collection programs 
work?  Should the public know which communication 
methods are being intercepted by the NSA and thus 
compromised, or what foreign embassies and consulates are 
being surveilled both inside and outside of the U.S., or how 
electronic beacons are implanted within targeted electronic 
devices, or how the NSA taps into the telecommunications of 
service providers, or know about U.S. collection priorities 
against foreign countries?     
Once the initial reporting on the Snowden leak began 
in June 2013, the media and public wanted to know more – 
what was the NSA collecting, what were they listening to, 
what were they doing with this information, who are they 
sharing this information with?  The actual legalities and 
illegalities of certain NSA programs and collection of data 
became more blurred as the media focused on the wide-scale 
public outrage at the idea that the government was spying on 
its own citizens regardless of the legalities.  The media 
emphasized the public’s ever-increasing distrust of 
government and the intelligence community’s (IC)5 classified 
programs. 
                                                 
4 Benjamin Franklin, Poor Richard’s Almanack (1735), available at 
http://www.vlib.us/amdocs/texts/prichard35.html.  A student of 
mine recently informed me this is also the theme to a show entitled, 
“Pretty Little Liars.” 
5 “The Intelligence Community (IC) is a group of Executive Branch 
agencies and organizations that work separately and together to 
engage in intelligence activities that are necessary for the conduct of 
foreign relations and the protection of the national security of the 
United States.” OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, U.S. 
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: AN OVERVIEW 7 (2011), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/IC_Consumers_Guide_2011.
39                                                  3 LMU LAW REVIEW (2015) 
 
 
Now that the initial deluge of classified information 
from Snowden’s leaks has been disclosed, the questions are 
two-fold: (1) are these expansive collection programs by the IC 
legal or illegal and (2) if legal, are these “whistleblower” 
disclosures justified given the resultant damage these leaks 
have caused to our national security and law enforcement’s 
ability to prevent the commission of future crimes? 
 
II. LEGALITY OF IC’S ACTIONS 
 
What is difficult to determine from the recent media 
disclosures is what exactly is being collected, how is the 
information collected, at what point can communications be 
accessed and analyzed, who receives the analysis, and what is 
the legal justification for each step along this process. There is 
a significant distinction between authorizations to collect 
telephone caller identification record information, or “to” and 
“from” information on a particular email address, versus 
authorization to listen in on the content of such 
communications. If this distinction is not made clear, then the 
public can draw erroneous conclusions about alleged breaches 
of privacy based upon misinformation. 
 
A. NSA’S BULK COLLECTION OF METADATA: SECTION 215 
 
Snowden disclosed that the NSA is collecting the 
metadata from millions and even billions of phone calls and 
emails sent out every day, including Americans’ emails and 
                                                                                                       
pdf.   Sixteen United States intelligence agencies comprise the IC and 
are under the Office of the Director of the National Intelligence: the 
Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the 
Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) National Security Branch, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) Office of National Security Intelligence, 
Department of Treasury Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 
Department of Energy Office of Intelligence and Counter-
intelligence, State Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department 
of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and Army, 
Air Force, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, and Naval Intelligence. See id. 
at 9. 
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phone calls.6  Metadata includes “much of the information that 
appears on a customer’s telephone bill: the date and time of a 
call, its duration, and the participating telephone numbers” 
and can include the nature of “how the call was routed from 
one participant to the other through the infrastructure of the 
telephone companies’ networks.”7  
The NSA was given this power when the PATRIOT 
Act was passed post-9/11.8  Section 215 of the Act allows the 
government to obtain a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court (FISC or FISA court) order every ninety days requiring 
third parties (including telecommunications providers) to 
hand over any records or other “tangible thing” if deemed 
“relevant” to “any investigation to obtain foreign intelligence 
information not concerning a U.S. person or to protect against 
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”9   
The NSA utilized this “Access to Certain Business 
Records for Foreign Intelligence and International Terrorism 
Investigations” power to justify their bulk telephone records 
collection program.10 The NSA began to collect metadata from 
all sorts of third parties, including telecommunications carriers 
and internet providers, in order to have the information close 
                                                 
6 GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE 
NSA, AND THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE 30-32 (2014). 
7 PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT 
ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED 
UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE 
OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE COURT 8, 21 (Jan. 23, 2014) [hereinafter PCLOB 
TELEPHONE RECORDS REPORT], available at 
http://www.pclob.gov/library/215-
Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf.    
8 Id.  
9 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT 
Act) Act of 2001, sec 208(1), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 
[hereinafter PATRIOT Act] (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
107publ56/pdf/PLAW-107publ56.pdf., at sec. 215.  See also BRENNAN 
CENTER FOR JUSTICE, ARE THEY ALLOWED TO DO THAT? A 
BREAKDOWN OF SELECTED GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS 1 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Gover
nment%20Surveillance%20Factsheet.pdf.     
10 PCLOB TELEPHONE RECORDS REPORT, supra note 7, at 8.  
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at hand when it came time to conduct a targeted search.11 The 
NSA stores these collected telephone records in a centralized 
database.12 Before an analyst can access the database and 
search for a specific number or selection term, “one of twenty-
two designated NSA officials must first determine there is a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the number is associated 
with terrorism.”13 Once the analyst gains approval, he or she 
“may run queries that will return the calling records for that 
seed [number], and permit ‘contact chaining’ to develop a 
fuller picture of the seed’s contacts. Contact chaining enables 
analysts to retrieve not only the numbers directly in contact 
with the seed number (“the first hop”), but also numbers in 
contact with all first hop numbers (the “second hop”), as well 
as all numbers in contact with all second hop numbers (the 
“third hop”).”14 
The government’s argument is that one cannot 
investigate and prevent terrorist attacks without real-time 
access to metadata to determine who is contacting whom and 
when.  “When the NSA identifies communications that may be 
associated with terrorism, it issues intelligence reports to other 
federal agencies, such as the FBI, that work to prevent terrorist 
attacks.”15 It is difficult to predict when attacks may occur, 
even more so if one hand is tied behind the IC’s back when not 
given the ability to follow a target’s phone number trail 
wherever that might lead. 
Critics of section 215 argue that by permitting 
intelligence agencies, specifically the NSA, to collect metadata 
from a variety of third parties, section 215 allows the 
government to get a whole picture of a person by searching 
one’s “financial, library, travel, video rental, phone, medical, 
church, synagogue, and mosque records . . . providing the 
government says it’s trying to protect against terrorism.”16  
                                                 
11 BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 1-2. 
12 PCLOB TELEPHONE RECORDS REPORT, supra note 7, at 8. 
13 Id. at 8-9. 
14 Id. at 9. 
15 Id. at 8. 
16 Emma Roller, This Is What Section 215 of the Patriot Act Does, SLATE 
(June 7, 2013, 1:17 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/weigel/2013/06/07/nsa_prism_scan
dal_what_patriot_act_section_215_does.html.  
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Metadata, “if properly exploited, could yield more valuable 
information than recordings of the phone calls or email 
messages themselves.”17   
Critics further argue that “[i]t is difficult to believe that 
the phone records of millions of Americans are actually 
‘relevant’ to a specific terrorist or foreign intelligence 
investigation. Nor does Section 215 appear to allow the 
government to collect first and determine relevance later, 
which is what the government claims it is doing.”18   
In January 2014, the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board (PCLOB)19 issued a report after reviewing the 
NSA’s bulk collection of phone records.  The PCLOB found 
the bulk collection of phone records failed to comply with 
Section 215 and therefore should be terminated or significantly 
revised.20  The PCLOB determined (1) the bulk telephone 
records acquired had “no connection to any specific FBI 
investigation at the time of their collection;” (2) since the 
records are collected in bulk, they are not “relevant” to a 
particular investigation as required under section 215; (3) 
requiring telephone companies to furnish new call records on 
a daily basis is not permitted under section 215 nor FISA; and 
(4) section 215 only permits the FBI and not the NSA to obtain 
records relevant to a terrorism or foreign intelligence 
investigation.21  
That same month, President Obama made his own 
comments regarding the section 215 program, stating he 
would continue to allow government use of bulk phone 
records while they attempt to come up with an alternative 
                                                 
17 SHANE HARRIS, THE WATCHERS: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S 
SURVEILLANCE STATE 204-05 (Penguin Books, 2011). 
18 BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 3. 
19 The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) was 
established in 2004 by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004.  In 2007, the 9/11 Commission Act 
restructured the Board requiring that all five members be appointed 
by the President.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(e)(e) (2012 & Supp. 2014).  
As a result, the Board did not fully exist until June 2013, after the 
Senate confirmed members to resume operations.  PRIVACY AND 
CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, http://www.pclob.gov/about-us 
(last visited Aug. 23, 2014).  
20 PCLOB TELEPHONE RECORDS REPORT, supra note 7, at 10. 
21 Id. 
43                                                  3 LMU LAW REVIEW (2015) 
 
 
solution “without the government holding this metadata 
itself” and would require the agency to get court approval 
prior to accessing the metadata.22  The NSA would also no 
longer be able to access records that go beyond two persons 
removed from the original query.23 
In response to these findings, in May 2014, the House 
passed the USA Freedom Act24 which focuses on the NSA’s 
call-records program in which the agency retains billions of 
records for all phone calls made from or to the United States. 
Under the legislation, telecommunications companies would 
retain those records, and the NSA would only have access to 
specific information about targeted individuals under court 
orders.25 A year later, due to inaction by the Senate, the bulk 
collection program under section 215 was allowed to expire on 
June 1, 2015.26 The Senate then approved the USA Freedom 
                                                 
22 Transcript of President Obama’s Jan. 17 Speech on NSA Reforms, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/full-text-of-president-
obamas-jan-17-speech-on-nsa-reforms/2014/01/17/fa33590a-7f8c-
11e3-9556-4a4bf7bcbd84_story.html.  
23 Id. 
24 USA Freedom Act, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. (2013-2014), available at 
https://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3361.  
25 Id. The bill “[r]equires the FBI to include in such tangible thing 
applications a specific selection term to be used as the basis for such 
production.” Id. A “specific selection term” is “a term specifically 
identifying a person, entity, account, address, or device” that is 
“used by the government to limit the scope of the information or 
tangible things sought pursuant to the statute.” Id. In each 
application requesting call detail records (i.e., telephone numbers 
and time or duration of a call), the FBI must show “(1) reasonable 
grounds to believe that the call detail records sought to be produced 
based on the specific selection term are relevant to such 
investigation; and (2) facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that such specific selection term is associated with a 
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.” Id.  
26 Opinion and Order In re Application of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things, 
Docket No. BR 15-75, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, June 
29, 2015 at 2. See also Erin Kelly, Here’s what happens now that the 
Patriot Act Provisions Expired, USA Today, June 1, 2015, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/05/31/patrio
t-act-expires-senate-stalemate/28260905/. 
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Act on June 2nd, and the revised Section 215 program which 
effectively eliminates bulk collection will continue until 
December 15, 2019.27 The USA Freedom Act allows the bulk 
collection of telephone metadata for only a 180 day transition 
period (until November 29, 2015) during which such collection 
could continue.28 
 
B. NSA’S MONITORING OF CONVERSATIONS: FISA AND 
SECTION 702 
 
Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act addresses the bulk 
collection of telephone records, and the FISA Amendments of 
2008 (FAA) address the collection and subsequent analysis of 
the content of telephone and internet communications.29 The 
FAA (also known as section 702) has been utilized to allow the 
NSA to work with electronic communication service providers 
“to copy, scan, and filter internet and phone traffic coming 
through their physical infrastructure” and compel the 
disclosure of the content of such communications so long as it 
targets foreign persons reasonably believed to be located 
outside the United States.30  No particular warrant is required 
in that instance. The targeting of the non-U.S. person on 
foreign soil must be conducted in order to acquire foreign 
                                                 
27 Opinion and Order In re Application of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things, 
Docket No. BR 15-75, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, June 
29, 2015 at 2-3 (citing to USA FREEDOM Act § 705(a)). 
28 Opinion and Order In re Application of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things, 
Docket No. BR 15-75, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, June 
29, 2015 at 10-11 (citing to section 109(a) of the USA FREEDOM Act). 
29 H.R. 6304, 110th Cong. (2007-2008), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr6304enr/pdf/BILLS-
110hr6304enr.pdf. 
30 ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, COMMENTS OF THE ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUNDATION REGARDING SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE AMENDMENTS ACT TO THE PRIVACY AND 
CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD 8 (Apr. 22, 2014), available at 
https://www.eff.org/files/2014/04/22/eff_pclob_comments_11_ap
ril_2014.pdf; See also H.R. 6304, 110th Cong. (2007-2008), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr6304enr/pdf/BILLS-
110hr6304enr.pdf. 
45                                                  3 LMU LAW REVIEW (2015) 
 
 
intelligence information as defined in FISA, and the NSA must 
obtain approval from the FISA court as to their targeting and 
minimization procedures prior to collection to make sure U.S. 
persons are not inadvertently intercepted.31  
Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to separate the 
collection of phone and internet communications of strictly 
foreign persons from U.S. persons if the foreign person is 
communicating with a U.S. person.32  These communications 
are also potentially being copied and stored in a searchable 
database.33 Information on U.S. persons may incidentally be 
collected if that U.S. person communicates with a non-U.S. 
person that is being targeted or two non-U.S. persons discuss 
the U.S. person.34 Or, a U.S. person’s conversation may 
inadvertently be collected by mistake if erroneously targeted 
by the NSA and thought to be a non-U.S. person.35 In the case 
of inadvertent collection, the communications must be 
destroyed.36 
The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board 
(PCLOB) approved of the Section 702 program in its report 
dated July 2, 2014, stating:  
                                                 
31 PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE 
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 6 (July 2, 2014) [hereinafter 
PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT], available at 
https://www.nsa.gov/civil_liberties/_files/pclob_section_702_repo
rt.pdf.  “The targeting procedures govern how the executive branch 
determines that a particular person is reasonably believed to be a 
non-U.S. person located outside the United States, and that targeting 
this person will lead to the acquisition of foreign intelligence 
information. The minimization procedures cover the acquisition, 
retention, use, and dissemination of any non-publicly available U.S. 
person information acquired through the Section 702 program.” Id. 
at 6-7. “For example, the NSA’s minimization procedures require 
that queries of Section 702-acquired information be designed so that 
they are ‘reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence 
information.’” Id. at 8. 
32 JAMES BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY: THE ULTRA-SECRET NSA 
FROM 9/11 TO THE EAVESDROPPING ON AMERICA 304 (Anchor Books, 
2009). 
33 Id.  
34 PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT, supra note 28, at 6. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
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[t]he Section 702 program has enabled the 
government to acquire a greater range of 
foreign intelligence than it otherwise would 
have been able to obtain – and to do so quickly 
and effectively.  Compared with the 
“traditional” FISA process under Title I of the 
statute, Section 702 imposes significantly fewer 
limits on the government . . . [t]he program has 
proven valuable in the government’s efforts to 
combat terrorism as well as in other areas of 
foreign intelligence. . . . [m]onitoring terrorist 
networks under Section 702 has enabled the 
government to learn how they operate, and to 
understand their priorities, strategies, and 
tactics.37   
 
While the core of the section 702 program was deemed 
to be “reasonable” under Fourth Amendment law, the PCLOB 
set forth additional proposals to address their concerns about 
 
the unknown and potentially large scope of the 
incidental collection of U.S. persons’ 
communications, the use of “about” collection 
to acquire Internet communications that are 
neither to nor from the target of surveillance, 
and the use of queries to search for the 
communications of specific U.S. persons within 
the information that has been collected.38  
 
On June 19, 2014, the House passed a bill that includes 
an amendment which bars the NSA, the CIA, and others in the 
IC from actually examining the communications of Americans 
that were collected into databases created to target 
foreigners.39  Critics have called this technique the “backdoor 
                                                 
37 Id. at 9-10.   
38 PCLOB TELEPHONE RECORDS REPORT, supra note 7, at 9. 
39 H.R. 5016, 113th Cong. (2013-2014), available at 
https://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-
bill/5016/amendments.  
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search loophole.”40  “The bill also prohibits the government 
from requiring a private company to alter its software to allow 
clandestine surveillance.”41  
 
C. LEGAL CONCLUSIONS AS TO IC ACTIONS 
 
In summary, upon review of FISA, the FAA, and the 
PATRIOT Act, it would be lawful for the NSA to monitor 
electronic communications of foreign persons reasonably 
believed42 to be located overseas without any type of warrant.  
However, if that person is a “U.S. person” or that foreign 
person was to communicate with a person located in the 
United States, the NSA would need to apply for a FISA 
warrant.  The difficulty is in determining where the particular 
person is located at the time of the call.  While the law does 
not allow the intentional monitoring of U.S. persons, the FISC 
approves minimization procedures to limit the amount of 
information about U.S. persons that is intercepted, retained, 
and disseminated.  Hence, the IC’s monitoring of content in 
communications is legal. 
On the other hand, the legality of the NSA’s collection 
of metadata is uncertain. While the NSA had previously used 
section 215 of the PATRIOT Act to justify its bulk records 
                                                 
40 Charlie Savage, House Votes to Curb N.S.A. Scrutiny of Americans’ 
Communications, NY TIMES (June 20, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/21/us/politics/house-votes-to-
curb-nsa-scrutiny-of-americans-communications.html.   
41 Andrew Rosenthal, The House Actually Did Something About 
Warrantless Surveillance, TAKING NOTE: THE EDITORIAL PAGE EDITOR’S 
BLOG (June 20, 2014, 1:30 PM), 
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/20/the-house-
actually-did-something-about-warrantless-surveillance/.   
42 “[T]he NSA has reportedly interpreted that to mean that it need 
only ensure ’51 percent confidence of the target’s ‘foreignness.’”  
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 3;  See also Barton 
Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British intelligence mining data from 
nine U.S. Internet companies in broad secret program, WASH. POST (June 
6, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-
intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-
secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-
d970ccb04497_story.html.  
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collection program,43 it is now clear that the NSA has been 
collecting more than foreign persons’ metadata and metadata 
not necessarily relevant to a terrorism or foreign intelligence 
investigation.44  Regardless, the bulk data collection of 
business records and other tangible things, as we know it, will 
terminate after November 29, 2015.45 After such date, the IC 
will have to furnish “specific selection term[s]” to the FISC 
before being granted access to such metadata from third party 
communications providers.46 However, at the time of the 
Snowden leak, both the monitoring of content and the bulk 
records collection program were legally justified. 
 
III. SNOWDEN’S REASONS FOR DISCLOSURE VERSUS DAMAGE 
DONE TO NATIONAL SECURITY 
 
A. BULK COLLECTION AND KEEPING THE INTERNET 
“FREE” 
 
Snowden’s real complaint seems to boil down to the 
NSA’s collection of metadata – not the subsequent analysis of 
this data because targeting and minimization procedures have 
been put in place to avoid bulk analysis of the data collected.  
Therefore, Snowden is concerned about the potential for abuse 
in the collection of metadata not necessarily current abuse of 
power now that this data is in the hands of the NSA. 
                                                 
43 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(a)(1) (2003 & Supp. 2014). 
44 Barton Gellman et al., In NSA-intercepted Data, Those Not Targeted 
Far Outnumber the Foreigners Who Are, WASH. POST (July 5, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-nsa-
intercepted-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-
who-are/2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-
4b1b969b6322_story.html?hpid=z1.   
45 Opinion and Order In re Application of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things, 
Docket No. BR 15-75, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, June 
29, 2015 at 18. 
46 Opinion and Order In re Application of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things, 
Docket No. BR 15-75, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, June 
29, 2015 at 10 (citing to USA FREEDOM Act § 103(b), amending FISA 
§ 501(c)). 
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Snowden has given several interviews and written 
manifestos explaining why the public needs to know the 
specifics as to what the NSA is collecting and how they are 
collecting it. In Snowden’s eyes, only with the public’s input 
can true regulation and accountability take place.47 
Apparently, congressional oversight committees, the FISC, the 
Department of Justice, internal agency auditing and 
monitoring, and oversight from the Executive branch is not 
enough.  It bears reminding that the previously described 
collection and surveillance programs are regulated – by 
Congress, by the FISC, by the Department of Justice and by 
oversight lawyers within intelligence agencies themselves.48   
Snowden wants to keep the internet free from NSA 
collection – so that those who grow up on the internet feel free 
to explore, make mistakes, and express themselves without 
fear that anyone is watching.49  Unfortunately, regardless of 
whether the NSA is watching, others are and will always be 
watching. Private companies make it their mission to collect as 
much information as possible on individual consumers and 
sell it to the highest commercial bidder. Criminals both 
overseas and in our own back yard who want to steal our 
information are monitoring and exploiting the Internet as well. 
Director of the FBI, James Comey, recently stated,  
                                                 
47 GREENWALD, supra note 6, at 13, 30-31. 
48 At a recent debate, former CIA director James Woolsey stated,  
I have seen, either from in the Executive 
Branch, or as a private citizen interested in 
these issues and following them, the 
oversight personnel capabilities, numbers of 
offices, numbers of people involved in 
overseeing the American system of 
intelligence is truly awesome. There is no 
country anywhere in the world that has the 
massive oversight from legislative, judicial, 
and executive sides and functions over their 
intelligence systems. Nobody is even close 
to the United States. 
Transcript of INTELLIGENCE SQUARED U.S. debate, Snowden was 
justified, (Feb. 12, 2014), available at 
http://intelligencesquaredus.org/images/debates/past/transcripts
/021214%20Snowden.pdf.   
49 GREENWALD, supra note 6, at 46-47. 
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I think there's something about sitting in front 
of your own computer working on your own 
banking, your own health care, your own social 
life that makes it hard to understand the danger 
(of third party surveillance, cybercrime, and 
cyber-attacks on companies and individuals on 
the internet). I mean, the Internet is the most 
dangerous parking lot imaginable. But if you 
were crossing a mall parking lot late at night, 
your entire sense of danger would be 
heightened. You would stand straight. You'd 
walk quickly. You'd know where you were 
going. You would look for light. Folks are 
wandering around that proverbial parking lot 
of the Internet all day long, without giving it a 
thought to whose attachments they're opening, 
what sites they're visiting. And that makes it 
easy for the bad guys.50 
 
The Internet, unfortunately, will never be free from 
surveillance. Even if our government is not monitoring the 
Internet, there will always be a myriad of bad actors that do.  
Foreign Intelligence Services target the Internet to collect 
positive intelligence and steal trade secrets, cyber criminals 
hack into our private e-mails and steal personal identification 
information, terrorist organizations promote jihad and the 
destruction of our cyber infrastructure.  
More importantly, do we want our government to be 
proactive and attempt to prevent or disrupt terrorist attacks 
before they take place? If the answer is yes, then we need to 
provide federal law enforcement with a requisite amount of 
surveillance tools to be able to accomplish this mission.  
 
 
 
                                                 
50 Transcript of Interview by Scott Pelley with James Comey, Oct. 5, 
2014, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fbi-director-
james-comey-on-threat-of-isis-cybercrime/. 
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B. BULK COLLECTION AND THE POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE OF 
POWER 
 
Snowden’s argument for public disclosure would be 
much stronger if he could point to specific abuses of power 
that would liken current NSA activities to those abuses 
disclosed in the 1970’s during the Church Committee hearings. 
The Church Committee discovered that the IC had illegally 
gathered information and compiled files on communists in the 
1950s and civil rights groups and Vietnam War protesters in 
the 1960s.51 These findings resulted in a significant overhaul in 
IC oversight and accountability and the passage of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 in order to prevent 
future abuse of power by the IC.52 
 In addition to his concerns about NSA spying on 
Americans through its bulk collection programs, Snowden 
also disclosed examples of individual government employees 
who abused the power and responsibility placed in their 
hands.  This abuse of power was illegal, and the offenders 
should have faced criminal or severe administrative penalties, 
but their behavior in many instances was either condoned or 
overlooked. In one article, Snowden is quoted as saying,  
 
Many of the people searching through the 
haystacks were young, enlisted guys, 18 to 22 
years old. They’ve suddenly been thrust into a 
position of extraordinary responsibility, where 
they now have access to all your private 
records. In the course of their daily work, they 
stumble across something that is completely 
unrelated in any sort of necessary sense – for 
example, an intimate nude photo of someone in 
a sexually compromising situation. But they’re 
extremely attractive. So what do they do? They 
turn around in their chair and they show a co-
                                                 
51 UNITED STATES SENATE, Senate History: January 27, 1975 Church 
Committee Created, 
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Church_Co
mmittee_Created.htm.   
52 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 
92 Stat. 1793 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 to 1811 (2014)). 
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worker. And their co-worker says, “Oh, hey, 
that’s great. Send that to Bill down the way,” 
and then Bill sends it to George, George sends it 
to Tom, and sooner or later this person’s whole 
life has been seen by all of these other people. 
The analysts don’t discuss such things in the 
NSA cafeterias, but back in the office anything 
goes, more or less. You’re in a vaulted space. 
Everybody has sort of similar clearances, 
everybody knows everybody. It’s a small 
world. It’s never reported, because the auditing 
of these systems is incredibly weak. The fact 
that records of your intimate moments have 
been taken from your private communication 
stream, from the intended recipient, and given 
to the government, without any specific 
authorisation, without any specific need, is 
itself a violation of your rights. [When asked 
how often do such things happen?] . . . I’d say 
probably every two months. It’s routine 
enough. These are seen as sort of the fringe 
benefits of surveillance positions.53 
 
Everyone would agree that NSA analysts should not be 
opening private email attachments that contain naked photos 
(or any non-foreign intelligence related material for that 
matter) and sending them to their colleagues.  This is illegal 
and there should be repercussions.  But was exposure of 
childish behavior by a few analysts of such significance to 
outweigh the damage done to our nation’s security due to 
Snowden’s disclosures?   
Other reasons why Snowden made such disclosures 
include: (1) disgust over CIA operatives who would get 
targets drunk enough to land in jail and then bail them out in 
order to recruit an asset,54 (2) Clapper lying in a congressional 
                                                 
53 Alan Rusbridger & Ewan Macaskill, I, Spy: Edward Snowden in 
Exile, THE GUARDIAN, July 19, 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/18/-sp-edward-
snowden-interview-rusbridger-macaskill.   
54 James Bamford, The Most Wanted Man in the World, WIRED, Aug. 13, 
2014, http://www.wired.com/2014/08/edward-snowden/.  
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hearing about whether the NSA collects data on Americans,55 
(3) military and CIA drones and targeted killings,56 (4) outrage 
over the NSA’s “ability to map the movement of everyone in a 
city by monitoring their MAC address, a unique identifier 
emitted by every cell phone, computer, and other electronic 
device,”57 (5) NSA’s access to email and other Internet traffic 
from Syria during the civil war,58 (6) the NSA’s building of a 
Massive Data Repository where “billions of phone calls, faxes, 
emails, computer-to-computer data transfers, and text 
messages from around the world [would] flow through the 
MDR every hour,”59 and (7) the NSA’s access to virtually all 
private communications coming in from overseas to people in 
the US in order to “identify these malicious traffic flows and 
respond to them.”60 
Again, the resounding concern is collection, and the 
fact that the public is not told about the mass collection. As 
mentioned, some of Snowden’s complaints had nothing to do 
with bulk collection. Snowden did have a list of individual 
government employees whose actions merited administrative 
action and reprimand, but their specific activity did not 
undermine the legality or wisdom of the programs which 
Snowden was actually railing against. Snowden has certainly 
been successful at opening the dialogue as to bulk collection – 
as everyone is now discussing collection, how to reform or 
eliminate section 215, and how to move collection from 
government’s hands to a third party.61  
                                                 
55 At a congressional hearing on March 12, 2014, Senator Ron Wyden 
asked Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, “Does the 
NSA collect any type of data at all on millions or hundreds of 
millions of Americans?” Clapper responded, “No sir . . . not 
wittingly.”  Fred Kaplan, Fire James Clapper, SLATE, June 11, 2013, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/20
13/06/fire_dni_james_clapper_he_lied_to_congress_about_nsa_surv
eillance.html. 
56 Bamford, supra note 54. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Would a third party’s (telecommunications company) employees 
perform better than government employees and abuse their power 
much less than government employees that undergo background 
GOVERNMENT SECRETS                                                                     54 
Transparency is important to a certain degree. It keeps 
the government honest and it ensures the public can keep tabs 
on the checks and balances that are put in place to ensure 
abuse does not occur. But too much transparency defeats the 
very purpose of clandestine intelligence operations in the first 
place, i.e., to protect the American public and keep the bad 
guys in the dark as to our intentions and capabilities.  The 
general public has already been informed as to the purpose 
and mission of the NSA, plus a vague description of NSA 
collection platforms and capabilities is readily available.  Once 
you delve into the details such as specific methods and 
sources, and the identities of certain targets, then this 
information becomes sensitive and classified, and as such, 
should be available to only those who are trusted and have a 
legitimate need to know.  It may be advisable to have an open 
discussion on collection but there is no need to go into details 
that are classified, since such disclosures could cause harm to 
national security.  Whistleblowers certainly need to step 
forward to discuss abuse within the system, especially when 
these failures are not being addressed by oversight committees 
within or outside the IC agencies.  Certainly, on an individual 
level, when government analysts are caught monitoring calls 
and opening attachments that are not relevant to an 
authorized investigation, these people need to be brought to 
the attention of that agency’s internal security team.  However, 
there are multiple administrative layers of authority, policy 
review officials and security personnel available to anyone 
concerned who earnestly wants to report wrong doing or 
illegal activity. 
One concern raised by Snowden is the allegation that 
the NSA “has been gathering records of online sexual activity 
and evidence of visits to pornographic websites as part of a 
proposed plan to harm the reputations of those whom the 
agency believes are radicalizing others [to become devoted to 
the jihadist cause] through incendiary speeches.”62 The six 
                                                                                                       
checks and significant vetting before being granted top secret 
clearances? 
62 Glenn Greenwald, Ryan Grim, & Ryan Gallagher, Top Secret 
Document Reveals NSA Spied on Porn Habits as Part of Plan to Discredit 
‘Radicalizers’, HUFF. POST, Nov. 26, 2013, 
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“radicalizers” known to be targeted by the NSA were Muslim 
and all are believed to be currently residing outside the United 
States though one has been described as a U.S. person.63 
Snowden argued in a recent interview that this type of 
surveillance and individual targeting may easily find its way 
into U.S. politics, and these tactics could be used to spy on the 
pornography-viewing habits of political opponents. 64 
However, there is no evidence to suggest such a giant leap has 
been made, and this type of slippery slope is exactly what 
oversight committees, supervisors, and government lawyers, 
need to monitor, and prevent any subsequent abuse of 
power.65 
The United States Intelligence Community including 
the NSA collects foreign political, economic and military 
intelligence in order to provide U.S. policy makers with the 
necessary information to make the proper decisions in order to 
protect our national security and promote America’s best 
interests both at home and abroad.  To accomplish this goal, 
the IC, within certain legal limits needs to have access to every 
conceivable intelligence collection technique.  The moral and 
ethical use of these tools, the potential benefits and possibility 
for abuse, the advisability and public acceptance for these 
techniques, are questions and discussions best left to the three 
branches of our government, and the public, to a more limited 
extent, to iron out. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                       
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/nsa-porn-
muslims_n_4346128.html.  
63 Id. 
64 Bamford, supra note 54. 
65 For example, it was reported that CIA officers searched the 
computers of congressional staff while they prepared a Senate 
Intelligence Committee report on the CIA’s detention and 
interrogation program. The CIA’s inspector general investigated the 
matter and sent a criminal referral to the DOJ for further 
investigation. Mark Mazetti & Carl Hulse, Inquiry by C.I.A. Affirms It 
Spied on Senate Panel, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/01/world/senate-intelligence-
commitee-cia-interrogation-report.html?_r=0. This is exactly what 
needs to be done when abuse of power is suspected. 
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IV. THE DAMAGE DONE 
 
Chairman of the Foundation for Defense of 
Democracies and former Director of the CIA, James Woolsey, 
during a recent debate on whether Snowden was justified, 
described four programs which have been compromised due 
to the disclosures: (1) pre-Snowden, the IC had learned how to 
counter Chinese cyber-attacks by sending their malware back 
to the hackers after making some adjustments and creating 
problems for them; Snowden’s disclosures explained how the 
U.S. was able to do this; (2) pre-Snowden, the IC was able to 
read emails and early stage drafts of emails of the Islamic State 
of Iraq; Snowden’s disclosures allowed the terrorist group to 
learn of this; (3) pre-Snowden, the Defense Department had 
technology that allowed soldiers and CIA operatives to know 
whether they were being followed; post-Snowden, this 
technology has been shared with our adversaries; and (4) pre-
Snowden, the U.S. learned how to penetrate the 
communication networks in some Latin American countries of 
some of the worst organizations and groups that are selling 
women, principally women into sexual slavery; post-Snowden 
those sex trafficking organizations now know which 
communication networks are compromised.66  
Any time a government employee or unauthorized 
person reveals sources and methods used by law enforcement 
or the IC, this disclosure allows criminals, spies, and terrorists 
alike to minimize their risk of getting caught by taking 
countermeasures. When FBI Director Comey reveals that “the 
emergence of default encryption settings and encrypted 
devices and networks” will “leave law enforcement in the 
dark” and then names the specific companies building these 
devices, the concern is that criminals will use these loopholes 
to avoid detection.67 The protection of sources and methods is 
critical to curtail illegal activity. 
                                                 
66 Transcript of INTELLIGENCE SQUARED U.S. debate, supra note 43. 
67 Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a Collision 
Course? A Conversation with FBI Director James Comey, BROOKINGS 
INST., Oct. 16, 2014, transcript available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2014/10/16%20goin
g%20dark%20technology%20privacy%20comey%20fbi/20141016_fbi
_comey_transcript.pdf. 
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Perhaps the exposure of specific programs, sources, 
and methods is not the only problem, since there is now the 
dilemma or revelation of what was not disclosed, what does 
not exist, which indirectly underscores NSA limitations.  In 
other words, if all of NSA’s programs are disclosed, 
theoretically everything that was not revealed does not exist.  
NSA surveillance capabilities would be limited to the 
techniques exposed by Snowden and others.  Criminals and 
terrorists alike have typically displayed signs of paranoia 
believing that IC capabilities approach the levels of those 
depicted in science fiction, and some adversaries are 
concerned that their every move is being watched by law 
enforcement.  And more than likely, our sophisticated 
adversaries assume the government has greater surveillance 
powers than they actually do.  The mystique of “big brother” 
can be a more effective weapon and deterrent than if our 
adversaries actually knew our true capabilities. What these 
disclosures have revealed is that the government has limits to 
what they can target, who they can target, and what they can 
access. As Snowden argues in his own words, “[t]he fact that 
people know communications can be monitored does not stop 
people from communicating [digitally]. Because the only 
choices are to accept the risk, or to not communicate at all.”68 
But at least now, our adversaries know which communication 
service providers cooperate with the government, the specific 
collection techniques being used, and where the IC has 
focused the majority of its efforts.  Our adversaries can now 
develop countermeasures, alternative methods of 
communicating with one another, and avoid or eliminate 
operations with identified vulnerabilities.  NSA’s mystique of 
know-all, see-all has been seriously tarnished.  
Extensive damage has been done to U.S. credibility and 
trust issues with its foreign allies who no longer blindly trust 
the United States with their intelligence secrets.  Our allies 
have reassessed the level of their cooperation on intelligence 
                                                 
68 Bamford, supra note 54. “And when we’re talking about things like 
terrorist cells, nuclear proliferators – these are organised cells. These 
are things an individual cannot do on their own. So if they abstain 
from communicating, we’ve already won. If we’ve basically talked 
the terrorists out of using our modern communications networks, we 
have benefited in terms of security – we haven’t lost.” Id. 
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sharing since the United States has been shown incapable of 
keeping secrets and even occasionally spies on its closest 
foreign partners.  Foreign allies may be hesitant to cooperate 
on the next terrorism investigation. Communications service 
providers that were willing to cooperate with the government 
previously on issues dealing with national security and efforts 
to combat terrorism are now exposed, and may refuse to 
cooperate with the government in the future without being 
forced to do so by a court order.    
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
It is not surprising Snowden revealed top secret 
information on NSA surveillance programs twelve years after 
9/11. When the PATRIOT Act, which provided the IC and law 
enforcement with expansive surveillance and investigative 
powers, passed in 2001, the law had strong popular support. 
Americans feared for their safety. The government took 
significant legal steps to ensure they would be better able to 
attempt to predict and prevent another terrorist attack before 
it occurred, and they have been, for the most part, extremely 
successful in thwarting other 9/11-type attacks. Therefore, it is 
ironic that the IC’s own success has paved the way for 
whistleblowers such as Snowden to gain sufficient popularity 
in order to reveal NSA programs under the guise of being 
concerned about our right to privacy. The pendulum has 
swung the other way, and Americans are more concerned 
about potentially being monitored by the government than 
they were immediately after 9/11. If the government had been 
unsuccessful in preventing attacks, the concern would be 
entirely different. The question would be what more can the 
IC do to prevent such attacks from occurring rather than the 
current question as to why the government is collecting so 
much personal data. The risk of terrorist attacks seems to be, at 
the very least, stabilized, and the bigger concern is our civil 
liberties. Due to its success, the IC is now on the defensive (for 
the opposite reason, i.e., intelligence failures identified post 
9/11, the IC was encouraged to go on the offense).  The 
pendulum swings in both directions.  
In short, all the media hype and “24/7 surveillance 
state” diatribes should be taken with a grain of salt.  The 
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moniker “big, bad government” is a misnomer although our 
system remains imperfect.   Our leadership and government 
employees are for the most part decent, honest, reliable folks 
who are doing their jobs to the best of their ability. Some 
government employees are abusing their power and should be 
punished.  When discussing government surveillance 
practices, there must be adequate oversight to avoid 
widespread, abusive practices that gradually become so 
pervasive that they are deemed acceptable: the habitual, 
standard routine that becomes self-justifying and immune to 
conscience and ethical scrutiny. However, full and specific 
disclosure when it comes to the sensitive nature of intelligence 
collection and its analysis is unnecessary.  There are legal 
remedies, anonymous tip lines, and multiple avenues to report 
wrong doing when a whistleblower becomes concerned about 
“perceived” illegal activity by the government.  Snowden did 
not pursue most of these legal remedies before disclosing 
classified information to the media.  It is true that certain 
aspects of NSA’s bulk collection and interception efforts may 
require further review and legal clarifications, but such 
discussions need not take place on the front page of 
newspapers.    The recent disclosures of NSA abuse as 
“perceived” by Snowden do not come close to the pervasive 
abuses described by the Church Committee in the seventies. 
Despite Snowden’s pleas for an open-source 
community free from monitoring, the Internet is not and will 
not be free from surveillance regardless if the NSA participates 
or not. It is naive to think otherwise.  The government needs to 
collect and analyze intelligence information in order to arrive 
at the best domestic, foreign, economic, military, law 
enforcement, or political decisions possible, and that includes 
policy decisions on the fight against terrorism.   
In one interview, Snowden makes reference to the 
German Stasi that conducted “mass, indiscriminate spying 
campaigns”69 in communist-dominated East Germany where 
the secret police collected information on roughly one quarter 
of the population.70 The NSA is not the Stasi of East Germany 
                                                 
69 Rusbridger & Macaskill, supra note 48. 
70 Julia Angwin, You Know Who Else Collected Metadata? The Stasi., 
PROPUBLICA, Feb. 11, 2014, 
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– the NSA is not conducting mass, indiscriminate spying 
campaigns hoping to catch anti-government protestors in 
incriminating positions in order to lock them away and 
eliminate any and all dissent. Stasi-like dossiers are not being 
created on individuals who vote a certain way or oppose 
government policies.  NSA does not monitor U.S. citizens to 
identify their daily activities, what errands they run, what 
websites they are viewing, and how their children are doing in 
school. What NSA does do is collect positive intelligence 
information, foreign intelligence information which is 
collected and analysed under legal parameters.  These 
collection efforts are meant to protect U.S. citizens from future 
terrorist attacks and future cyber-attacks. Under section 702, 
targeting and minimization procedures are in place, and FISA 
warrants are required when the NSA wants to target U.S. 
citizens suspected of being agents of a foreign power.  
It is not the government surveillance programs we 
should be overly concerned about.  Public discussion and 
congressional and internal oversight committees keep those 
necessary but controversial programs under control and 
within legal parameters. It is the few isolated cases of 
individuals within the government who abuse their power 
and betray the American people who are of major concern, 
e.g., those who abuse their power and violate sections 215, 702 
and FISA laws.  Those are the illegalities that should be 
brought to light, not our government’s specific sources, 
methods, capabilities, and successes that our enemies 
desperately want revealed.  
                                                                                                       
http://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-stasi-spied-on-social-
networks.  
